Terrorism in India’s Jammu and Kashmir. 2. Why?

Despite its internal troubles—or perhaps because of them—Pakistan still seems to believe that supporting terrorism can yield political dividends. 

By A. Sahara Alexander

May 30, 2025

Article 2 of 2. Read article 1.

Pakistan’s General Asim Munir. Credits.

In the first article of this series, I explained the role of Pakistan in fueling terrorism in India’s Jammu and Kashmir. But what advantage does Pakistan seek in all of this?

Today, Pakistan is a profoundly unstable country. Its economy is paralyzed, and its political leadership appears directionless. Even the aid and support provided by Beijing as part of the “Belt and Road Initiative” strategy seem inadequate to stabilize the situation.

The country is also experiencing tremendous internal pressure—from the Baloch and Pashtun communities in its western provinces, as well as from rising discontent within Pakistan-administered Kashmir. This unrest primarily stems from the central government’s discriminatory treatment and exploitation of local resources. Pakistan now faces a significant risk of internal fragmentation, or even an actual split.

Moreover, Pakistan’s longstanding policy of supporting terrorist groups is backfiring. The country frequently suffers attacks from the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP or IS-KP), a transnational branch of ISIS primarily based in Afghanistan and active in Central Asia, with growing influence in certain areas of Pakistan. Additionally, Pakistan’s western border faces daily skirmishes with the Taliban forces of Afghanistan—forces it once nurtured that have since turned against it.

All of this has not only damaged the reputation of the Pakistani government but, more critically, has undermined the credibility of the Pakistan Army. This situation has created significant discontent among the general population. As has often happened in the past, the military establishment resorts to adventurism in Indian-administered Kashmir as a means to deflect domestic pressure and reassert its authority at home.

The current situation in Pakistan provides a clear context for the recent terrorist attacks against India. Historically, every period of heightened internal unrest, civil-military tension, or political imbalance in Pakistan has coincided with escalatory actions against India, with Kashmir as the primary focus.

The Kargil War, fought between India and Pakistan from May to July 1999 in the Kargil district of Ladakh; the violent attack on the Indian Parliament in Delhi on December 13, 2001, carried out by JeM, resulting in the deaths of nine innocents and all five attackers; the 2008 Mumbai attacks; the assault on September 18, 2016, by JeM against an Indian Army brigade headquarters near Uri in Jammu and Kashmir, which killed 19 Indian soldiers and injured between 19 and 30 others; and the Pulwama suicide bombing of 2019—all bear the hallmarks of a deliberate strategy aimed at shifting domestic attention toward external conflict with India.

Protests in Mumbai after the 2008 attacks. Credits.

The recent resurgence of terrorism in Pakistan can also be attributed to the increasingly lax oversight by the international community regarding Pakistan’s activities in the last few years. This permissiveness became significantly more pronounced after June 2022, when Pakistan was removed from the “grey list” of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—an intergovernmental organization established in 1989 by the G7 to combat money laundering and, since 2001, terrorism financing.

Taking advantage of this shift, in 2024, Pakistan relaxed its laws regarding the registration of madrassas. These changes have allowed madrassas to alter their curricula and manage their finances with increased autonomy, creating a fertile environment for radicalization. Terrorist groups like LeT and JeM have exploited these regulatory relaxations to expand their influence within these religious schools, which continue to serve as primary centers for radical indoctrination not only in Pakistan but throughout the broader region. Notably, these actions represent a clear violation of FATF norms.

General Asim Munir, the current Chief of Army Staff, appears to be a key figure behind the strategic weaponization of Pakistan’s internal instability and its posture on the international stage. He is now seen as the principal architect of the revival of the so-called doctrine of “managed escalation.” General Munir’s ideological leanings are widely recognized within military and political circles; he is a hardliner with deeply conservative, regressive views.

His ideological stance was evident during a public address delivered in Islamabad on April 16, 2025, at the First Annual Convention of Overseas Pakistanis (April 13–16), organized by the Pakistani government. In his speech, General Munir reaffirmed his commitment to the “Two-Nation Theory,” asserting that Kashmir remains Pakistan’s “jugular vein.” He went on to declare: “We [Muslims] are different from Hindus in every possible aspect of life. Our religion is different. Our customs are different. Our traditions are different. Our thoughts are different. Our ambitions are different.”

This rhetoric suggests that peaceful coexistence is impossible, particularly in Kashmir, which—under this worldview—must remain a constant battleground. Such declarations fundamentally dismiss the possibility of peace and promote an atmosphere of ongoing conflict.

Moreover, General Munir’s words on that occasion were not limited to hostility toward Hindus or India. He extended his message to a broader global audience, stating: “Our beloved [compatriots], who are overseas, because you live in different civilizations, don’t you ever forget that you belong to a superior ideology and a superior culture.” Such language not only promotes religious and cultural supremacism but also carries implications that could potentially threaten global security and social harmony.

In a particularly troubling remark, General Munir called for nurturing the younger generations of Pakistan with this same ideological framework—revealing a repressive and radical mindset that closely aligns with the ideology of Islamist extremist movements. His inflammatory speech was delivered just one week before the April 22 terrorist attack in Pahalgam.

One of General Munir’s inflammatory speeches. Screenshot.

Notably, General Munir also held the position of Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) during the Pulwama attack in February 2019, further associating his tenure with significant instances of cross-border terrorism.

Following the April terrorist attack in Pahalgam, India launched a targeted military operation against Pakistan on May 7, citing Pakistan’s support for the aggression. Through this action, India pursued three primary objectives—political, military, and psychological—by striking at terrorists and their infrastructure within Pakistani territory. In a coordinated operation named “Sindoor,” Indian forces targeted nine terrorist camps across the Line of Control, the de facto military border established in 1971 between the Indian- and Pakistani-controlled areas of Jammu and Kashmir. 

The Indian strikes targeted facilities associated with LeT, JeM, and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen—the militant wing of Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami party and the largest Kashmiri insurgent group.

No civilian or regular military sites were targeted during the operation. According to the Indian government, the operation represented a defining moment in the country’s campaign against cross-border terrorism.

Following three days of conflict, both India and Pakistan announced on May 10 that they had agreed to a ceasefire, with follow-up talks scheduled for May 12. Although each side has since accused the other of violating the ceasefire terms, the situation appears relatively stable. While it is not a permanent resolution, it is reasonable to believe that, for now, terrorist groups in the region have experienced a significant setback in their strategic capabilities.

One key element must still be highlighted—an aspect implied throughout the preceding analysis but not yet brought into direct focus.

While organizations based in Pakistan that are responsible for major terrorist attacks in India often (not always) operate under seemingly neutral names and provide political justifications for their actions, the cultural and religious motives behind this violence are unmistakable.

The terrorists in Pahalgam executed their innocent victims—almost without exception—after first verifying their religious affiliation as Hindus or, more broadly, as non-Muslims. In several instances, targeted tourists were asked to recite the Islamic “kalima,” the Muslim declaration of faith: “There is no deity but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah.” This was used as a litmus test to identify Muslims, who were then spared, while non-Muslims were targeted for execution.

Eyewitness accounts confirm this chilling pattern. In one video, a tourist recounted how her husband was shot dead by the attackers after they determined he was not a Muslim. A Bengali Hindu professor from Assam said he survived by reciting the “kalima.” A Christian tourist from Madhya Pradesh, however, was killed after failing to recite the Muslim profession of faith. Another Hindu tourist from West Bengal was slaughtered under similar circumstances. Many such stories have emerged from survivors and eyewitnesses.

The widow of Vynai Narwal with her husband’s coffin. She reported he was shot “for not being a Muslim.” Screenshot.

It must be clear to everyone that this should not be interpreted as an indictment of Islam or Muslim communities, but rather as a strong condemnation of terrorism and the brutal manipulation of religion—any religion—for violent purposes. While genuine religious devotion deserves protection and respect, the ideological distortion of religion is profoundly damaging. It undermines the essence of faith and creates dangerous confusion both among the general public and within political institutions.

Muslims should be free to recite their “kalima” without its use being exploited by terrorists as a tool for choosing victims. When militant extremists manipulate religious symbols and declarations—as happened in the Pahalgam attack and others—it is not merely an act of violence against human lives, but also a betrayal of the very religion they claim to defend.

Source: bitterwinter.org