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“Fox in the Henhouse”: U.S. Taxpayers Financing China’s Military Progress

A parliamentary report provides troubling data on how American universities use public funds for joint projects with army-related Chinese partners.


September 17, 2025


An AI-generated summary of the report.
An AI-generated summary of the report.

An unsettling drama has unfolded in the gilded halls of American academia—where tweed jackets meet quantum computing and the espresso flows as freely as ideas. The U.S. House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party’s “Fox in the Henhouse” report reads less like a dry policy document and more like a noir thriller set in the ivy-covered corridors of elite research institutions. The twist? The villain isn’t lurking in the shadows—it’s sitting across the lab bench.


The report chronicles a troubling pattern: U.S. universities, buoyed by Department of Defense (DOD) grants and the noble pursuit of knowledge, have unwittingly become conduits for China’s military advancement. Over 1,400 research papers published between 2023 and 2025—many funded by American taxpayers—were co-authored with Chinese entities directly tied to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its sprawling defense-industrial complex.


Among the most eyebrow-raising collaborators are China’s “Seven Sons of National Defense”—a cadre of universities with deep PLA ties—and institutions on U.S. government restricted lists. These aren’t benign academic partners; they’re state-directed engines of military innovation. Yet, DOD-funded researchers continued to work with them.


The collaborations weren’t limited to innocuous fields. They spanned hypersonic weapons, quantum sensing, semiconductors, cyber warfare, and next-gen propulsion. In one case, U.S. researchers partnered with a Chinese lab on nitrogen research that allegedly contributed to breakthroughs in high-yield explosives—advancements now credited with bolstering China’s nuclear weapons program.


Another case involved a U.S. professor whose decade-long partnership with the Chinese Academy of Engineering was hailed by Beijing as instrumental in narrowing the technological gap with the West. The professor’s work—funded by the U.S. Navy—was repurposed to develop lightweight structural materials for Chinese aerospace and defense applications.


Congressman John Moolenaar, the Chair of the Select Committee on the CCP, and the report.
Congressman John Moolenaar, the Chair of the Select Committee on the CCP, and the report.

The irony is almost literary: the very openness that defines Western scientific inquiry has become its Achilles’ heel. While American researchers operate under transparency and reciprocal trust norms, their Chinese counterparts are embedded in a state-directed system designed to absorb foreign innovation and channel it into strategic military gains.


China’s talent recruitment programs, joint research platforms, and legal mandates—like the National Intelligence Law—form a sophisticated architecture for technology transfer. The report reveals how Chinese nationals, often educated in the U.S., are encouraged to use American lab access, equipment, and funding to support domestic defense development.


Despite years of warnings—from the 1999 Cox Report to FBI Director Christopher Wray’s 2019 testimony—DOD research security remains fragmented and toothless. The Department lacks a centralized system for monitoring foreign collaborations, doesn’t prohibit partnerships with entities on federal restricted lists, and fails to conduct post-award compliance checks—even when risk mitigation is required.


The result? A sprawling, taxpayer-funded pipeline of innovation flowing straight into the hands of Beijing’s bloody regime.


In a twist worthy of Kafka, the U.S. taxpayer is footing the bill for research that may one day be used against American forces. The report doesn’t just expose a policy failure—it paints a portrait of institutional naïveté, where the pursuit of knowledge has been weaponized by a regime that views science not as a shared endeavor, but as a strategic asset.


In response, Congress has proposed the SAFE Research Act, which would prohibit funding to researchers and universities that collaborate with foreign adversary-controlled entities. But one wonders: Is it too little, too late?


Ultimately, Fox in the Henhouse is a cautionary tale—equal parts espionage, ethics, and irony. Even the most well-intentioned research can become a Trojan horse in the global race for technological supremacy. And sometimes, the fox doesn’t sneak in—it’s invited.





 
 
 

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